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CONSERVATIVE SUPREME COURT: ITS IMPACT ON
TRADITIONAL VALUES
Donald E. Wildmon*
Benjamin W. Bull**
Most court watchers agree that the changing composition of the
Supreme Court will ineluctably favor the interests of traditional
values organizations like the American Family Association. The
next decade will surely see the Court return to a more balanced
approach in line with the preservation of family values. Certainly
some will characterize the new Court as more conservative. To the
extent that it will emphasize core principles in the Constitution as
the bedrock from which it must proceed, it will be conservative.
Yet this is simply a return of the Court to its intended function:
interpretation and application of law textually found in the Consti-
tution or duly enacted legislation. No doubt the Court will be more
reluctant to manufacture new "rights" not specifically found in
these core sources. It will look to the Congress and the state legis-
latures to enact new rights as the social and political needs of the
people evolve. And in applying the Constitution it will no doubt
rely on the Framers' original intent.
There are certain areas where this renewed deference to legisla-
tive prerogatives and constitutional intent will be manifested.
Surely on issues relating to pornography, abortion, and religious
activities in public schools, the Court will move away from unnec-
essary and creative renderings of constitutional magnitude. As dis-
cussed below the net practical effect will be an increased ability of
state and federal legislative bodies to limit pornography and abor-
tion, combined with greater tolerance of religious activities in pub-
lic schools.
* Founder and President of the American Family Association, a pro-family activist Chris-
tian ministry with over 450,000 members and 650 local chapters.
** General Counsel, American Family Association Law Center, a non-profit Christian le-
gal organization which defends and prosecutes civil rights of Christians. J.D., 1975, Univer-
sity of South Carolina School of Law.
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Pornography
The Supreme Court has historically accepted the truism that
pornography is harmful to society.' Attempting to address the
growing societal problems of illegal pornography, in Miller v. Cali-
fornia2 the Court enunciated a three-part definition for unpro-
tected obscene pornography in 1973. Since that time it is apparent
that the Miller test has become more problem than solution. It has
invited endless litigation over the meaning of its often criticized
concepts.' As a result, many prosecutors, while recognizing the
harms of pornography, have simply given up prosecuting obscenity
cases.4
The essence of the problem with the Miller test is that it does
not spring from the Constitution itself. Rather it is an invention of
the Court.5 Justice Scalia has in fact specifically called for a "reex-
amination of Miller."' He will certainly be one of the Court's lead-
ers into the next century. But rather than doing away with pornog-
raphy restrictions, Justice Scalia and the other conservative
justices will likely facilitate state efforts to adopt stronger methods
for dealing with the pornography problem.
Certainly it is not unthinkable for the Court to abandon the
Miller test altogether and allow the various states and Congress to
define regulated pornography. It was not until Roth v. United
1. For instance, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973), the Court
observed that:
The States have a long-recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene
material in local commerce and in all places of public accommodation .... "[I]t has
been accepted as a postulate that 'the primary requirements of decency may be en-
forced against obscene publications.'"
[W]e hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity. . . .These include the interest of the public in the quality
of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city
centers, and, possibly the public safety itself.
Id. at 57 (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Under Miller, obscene pornography appeals
to a prurient interest, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id.
3. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491
(1985).
4. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMIS-
SION ON PORNOGRAPHY 53 (1986).
5. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
6. Pope, 481 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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States7 in 1957 that the Court seriously undertook to enunciate a
singular definition of obscenity. Historically, the states themselves
have been left to address the pornography problem. And there is
"no evidence, empirical or historical, that the stern 19th century
American censorship of public distribution and display of material
relating to sex ... in any way limited or affected expression of
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific ideas."8 Rather, the
period following Thomas Jefferson up to Theodore Roosevelt was
an "extraordinarily vigorous period" in literature.9
One approach that has been prominently suggested is the so-
called "per se rule." Under this approach a law would prohibit all
"hard core pornography," defined by its depiction of specific sex
acts. Such a statute would state:
No person with knowledge of the character of the material shall
knowingly distribute or exhibit, to the public or for commercial pur-
poses, any hard-core pornography.
Hard-core pornography means any material or performance that
explicitly depicts ultimate sexual acts, including vaginal or anal in-
tercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, anilingus, and masturbation, where
penetration, manipulation, or ejaculation of the genitals is clearly
visible. 10
As used by the Supreme Court and today's law enforcement au-
thorities, the words "hard-core pornography" have become synony-
mous with obscenity.1 It cannot be doubted that this type of regu-
lation would bring badly needed clarity into pornography
enforcement and remove, to a large extent, the troubling element
of vagueness. And this would certainly be in line with the Court's
mandate that government "be allowed a reasonable opportunity to
experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.' 12
7. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
8. Miller, 413 U.S. at 35.
9. Id.
10. Bruce A. Taylor, Hard Core Pornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 255, 272 (1988); see also BRUCE A. TAYLOR, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE FIRST" AMEND-
MENT IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 156-57 (1983); William W. Milligan, Obscenity: Malum
In Se or Only in Context? The Supreme Court's Long Ordeal, 7 CAP. U.L. REv. 631, 643-45
(1978).
11. Id.; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
12. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
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In the future the Court will doubtlessly continue to broaden the
ability of government to restrict the harmful pornography indus-
try. In the last few years we have seen the Court uphold laws
which prohibit nude dancing,' 3 ban mere possession and viewing of
child pornography, 14 permit the use of RICO statutes which em-
ploy obscenity violations as predicate offenses,' 5 permit the en-
forced closure of adult bookstores found to be used for prostitution
and lewdness,' 6 and the regulation of adult businesses under re-
strictive zoning ordinances.' 7 In the next decade the Court will
continue to expand the states' ability to use innovative means in
addressing the recognized pornography problem.
Student Religious Activities in the Public Schools
In the future we can expect the Supreme Court to take a more
accommodating stance with respect to religion in the schools. The
Court will return to an interpretation of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause1" consistent with that of the Founding Fa-
thers. The Framers never intended a complete "wall of separation"
between church and state.19 Indeed, the liberal Justice William 0.
Douglas even recognized that the First Amendment "does not say
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church
and State."20
In 1971 the Supreme Court attempted to enunciate a three-part
test for the application of the Establishment Clause in Lemon v.
Kurtzman. I Like the Miller test,22 the Lemon test is not found in
the Constitution but is one of Supreme Court invention. Over time
13. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
14. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
15. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
16. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
17. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
18. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1870-79
(5th ed. 1891).
20. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (Douglas, J.).
21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). To pass muster a government action
must have a secular purpose, secular effect, and avoid excessive government entanglement
with religion. Id.
22. 413 U.S. at 24.
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it has lost favor with much of the Court. Today it may be that only
two justices are still committed to the original Lemon test.2 3
Four Justices, lead by Justice Kennedy, have proposed a "coer-
cion" test:24 the "government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in any religion or its exercise" and it may not "give
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 'estab-
lishes a [state] religion or religous faith, or tends to do so.' ,,2" This
approach would recognize and accommodate the "central role reli-
gion plays in our society."26 It would certainly permit many stu-
dent religious activities forbidden under the bankrupt Lemon test.
For instance, "moment of silence" statutes allowing time for silent
religious meditation during the school day, would certainly pass
muster under the "coercion test.127
The recent trend away from strict separation of religion and
state was also illustrated in Board of Education of Westside Com-
munity Schools v. Mergens.28 There, for the first time, the Court
upheld the right of a student religious group to meet on school
premises. The trend towards greater toleration and accommoda-
tion of religious student activities will doubtlessly continue with
the addition of Justice Thomas to the Court.
Abortion
In 1973 the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade29 created a constitu-
tional "right to abortion." This is not a right found in the text of
the Constitution nor is it implied in any constitutional provision.
Rather, the right to abortion was purportedly contained within a
"right to privacy."'" Yet no "right to privacy," as such, is found in
23. Justices Blackmun and Stevens remain committed to the Lemon test. Justice
O'Connor would like to reformulate the Lemon test as the "endorsement test." JusticesKennedy, White, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist prefer the new "coercion" test. The
positions of Justices Souter and Thomas are not known at present. See Allegheny County v.
Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
24. Id. at 659-62.
25. Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnell, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
26. Id. at 657.
27. Compare Alleghany County v. Greater Pittsburg ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-62 (1989)
with Wallace v. Jaf'ree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (reviewing an Alabama statute authorizing one
minute of silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer and holding the stat-
ute was unconstitutional under the Lemon test).
28. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. Id. at 152-53.
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the Constitution. So, like the Miller test and the Lemon test, the
"right to abortion" is an invention of the Court itself. And because
its underpinnings are not firmly grounded in the text of the Con-
stitution, the "right to abortion" has gradually been eroded since
1973.
The so-called "right to abortion" has never received widespread
support for several obvious reasons. First, the Roe decision utterly
failed to take into account the interests of the unborn child.3 1 The
Court considered only the interests of pregnant women who chose
to terminate their unborn children.32 The interests of the human
life destroyed were neither considered nor discussed. Today, we
know that children are often conceived in laboratory test tubes and
are viable as human life from the moment of conception. Second,
the interests of the unborn child's father were completely ignored
in Roe. Finally, Bible-believing Christians have rejected Roe be-
cause it promoted a practice - abortion - which violates scrip-
tural teachings.3 It is doubtful the original Founding Fathers, who
were themselves Christians,34 would have ever considered the in-
clusion of feticide in the Constitution. Today's evangelical Chris-
tians find such a notion equally abhorrent.
In the future we can look forward to the inevitable overturning
of Roe and its "right to abortion" on demand. Certainly we have
seen the gradual chipping away of Roe. 6 Ultimately the "right to
abortion" will be defined and delimited by the legislative process
of Congress and the state legislatures.
31. See Roe, 411 U.S. at 164-65.
32. Id.
33. See Genesis 1:27 ("And God created man in his own image"); Exodus 20:13 ("You
shall not murder"); Psalms 139:16 ("Thine eyes have seen my unformed substance"); Isaiah
44:24 ("the Lord ... who formed you from the womb"); Jeremiah 1:56 ("Before I formed
you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you").
34. TIM F. LAHAYE, FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS (1989).
35. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Constitution contains no right to abortion.").
36. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod.
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1982); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981).
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Conclusion
The inevitable effect of a more conservative Supreme Court will
be the advancement of traditional values. On three key issues -
pornography, religious activities in the public schools, and abortion
- the Court will move toward such values. In doing so, the Court
will come into line with the traditional role.

